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This paper concerns itself with the transitions of temporary workers to the standard employment contract and to 
unemployment. Adopting an institutionalist framework, arguing that labour market institutions will parameterise 
outcome, three countries with different forms of market structuration are presented: Denmark, France and the UK. 
The primary expectation of the analysis is that temporary workers will have different labour market transitions as a 
result of the different institutional configurations they find themselves in. Using seven waves of the European 
Community Household Panel survey (ECHP), spanning a period from 1995 to 2001, the transitions to and from 
flexibilised labour are investigated using event history analysis techniques (Allison 1984; Blossfeld and Rowher 
1995). We find French temporary contract workers to be significantly less likely to obtain a permanent job than 
either Danish or UK temporary workers, though found the majority of temporary workers to enter a permanent 
contract within the observation period. The between country differences in temporary workers unemployment risks 
were less conclusive, though we found temporary workers to be more exposed to unemployment than permanent 
workers in each country. 
 4
1 Introduction 
There are broadly speaking two contradictory hypotheses concerning the relative ability of 
temporary contract employment to integrate workers to the standard employment contract. One 
considers the bridging function of temporary work, suggesting that temporary employment 
contracts can serve as an entry route to the standard employment contract. The second suggests 
that temporary employment leads to the marginalisation of atypical workers, with temporary 
workers the unfortunate inhabitants of a segmented and peripheral market. This paper presents 
an analysis of the transitions of temporary workers to both unemployment and the standard 
employment contract in an effort to test the relative merits of the bridging or marginalisation 
theses. In addition to these analyses the ‘fit’ of the bridging or marginalisation thesis to diver-
gent national contexts is investigated through comparative analyses. Here we establish whether 
different labour market and welfare institutions constrain temporary worker outcome diffe-
rentially and thereby establish whether nationally specific debates offer adequate accounts of 
temporary employment which are generalisable to divergent national contexts.  
Such an analysis has only recently been made possible through the collection of cross-national 
comparative data in the European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP). This paper uses 
the full panel sequence, spanning a period from 1995 through to 2001, and through careful 
data construction observes and measures the transitions of temporary contract workers through 
time.  
The structure of the paper is the following. Theoretical accounts of temporary contract employ-
ment are offered and categorised according to predictions of bridging versus marginalisation. 
The institutional context of the three countries analysed are reviewed as are the nation specific 
hypothesis of temporary worker outcome. In section 3 we present the data, the method of data 
construction and the methods of estimation. Section 4 presents non-parametric analyses of 
temporary workers labour market transitions while section 5 presents a series of multivariate 
models. These models allow us reveal the covariates which account for the transitions tempo-
rary workers make, and allow us identify whether temporary workers in different labour markets 
experience different labour market outcomes.  
 
1.1 Theories Predicting a Bridging Function 
One view is that temporary workers are probationary contract workers (Booth et al 2002; 
Henguelle 1994), that is workers who are employed on short-term contracts so that employers 
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can scan their skills and abilities before giving them entry to the standard employment con-
tract1. Such a perspective would predict a reasonable flow of workers from temporary contracts 
to permanent contracts and would, moreover, predict greater recourse to this form of contract 
in markets where employers’ information concerning skills and capabilities is bounded by poor 
skills development and co-ordination (Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1999) such as the UK. 
While probationary contract theory accounts for temporary contracts in terms of employers uses 
of them, it makes no references to employers’ differential utility of probationary contracts for 
different types of worker. It is argued here that probationary contracts are more likely to be 
used for highly skilled workers attempting to gain entry to primary labour market segments, 
rather than for lower grades of worker where the scanning function associated with probation 
will be too costly for the position under consideration. Empirical research suggesting temporary 
employment may provide a bridging function includes that of McGinnity, Mertens and Gundert 
(2004) who find convergence between West German temporary and permanent workers in their 
labour market outcomes five years after an initial period of temporary contract employment. 
Zijl, van den Berg and Heyma (2004) also find a bridging function in the Netherlands, with 
temporary work found to shorten the duration of unemployment. 
 
1.2 Theories Predicting Marginalisation 
The competing hypothesis presents temporary contract employment as marginalised employ-
ment with employers offering temporary contracts to lower grades of worker who they can 
consequentially hire or fire with considerable ease. The association of temporary employment 
with marginalised employment has its origins in dual labour market (Doeringer and Piore 1971; 
Doeringer and Piore 1985; Piore and Sabel 1984) and segmentation theories (Edwards 1979; 
Gordon et al. 1982) which predict little mobility from one labour market segment to another. 
Dual labour market theories predict stark skills differences between workers in the ‘core’ and 
‘peripheral’ segments as a result of the different technological requirements of each sector. In 
the core market, production and employment are stable, though their stability requires both 
economies of scale and consistency in product demand to offset the costs of technological 
advancements required in this sector. In the peripheral market, production is based in low skill, 
low cost labour that is hired and fired in accordance to the considerable fluctuations in product 
                                               
1 There is a tendency in the literature to refer to the screening function of temporary contract employment in a 
manner which is similar to that deployed here to refer to probation. The term screening is not used here to dis-
tinguish from earlier uses of the term screening (Weiss 1995) which refer to employers’ vetting future employees 
on the basis of their qualifications and not on the basis of a trial period used to uncover information not previously 
held by the employer.  
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demand. From this perspective the numerical flexibility required of workers in the secondary 
sector is likely to be obtained through the generation of temporary contract workers, who by 
definition are hired and fired with greater ease. Previous research which suggests that 
temporary employment leads to marginalisation includes that of Giesecke and Groß (2003, 
2004) and Scherer (2004). In their 2003 paper, based on West German data, Giesecke and Groß 
find temporary workers are more likely than permanent workers to become unemployed and to 
obtain further temporary contracts. In 2004, the same authors extend this analysis to the United 
Kingdom, they find that temporary workers in both countries are more likely than permanent 
workers to enter unemployment and to obtain further temporary contracts. Scherer (2004) looks 
at workers mobility to a series of different labour force and occupational statuses. The author 
establishes temporary workers in Italy to be more exposed to unemployment and labour market 
drop out than permanent contract workers2.  
Probationary contract theory and theories of dual and segmented markets offer us competing 
hypothesis concerning temporary workers’ propensity for mobility to permanent contracts. From 
the perspective of probationary contract theory we would expect temporary workers to be quite 
likely to make transitions to permanent contract employment (corresponding with the ‘bridging 
thesis’), while dual and segmented labour market theory lead us to expect temporary workers to 
be peripheral market occupants with reduced access to permanent contracts (corresponding to 
the ‘marginalisation thesis’). Both theories also offer us competing expectations of temporary 
workers unemployment risks. Probationary contract theory leads us to expect a portion of 
temps, those who after probation failed their employers’ expectations, to be at risk of 
unemployment. Crucially this theory also leads us to expect unemployment risk to be associated 
with unobserved criteria, such as motivation or collegiality, attributes which can only be 
determined on probation. Probationary contract theory, therefore, leads us to expect little 
observed difference between temporary workers who make transitions to unemployment and 
those who do not. Conversely, market segmentation theories; lead us to expect a strong 
tendency for temporary employment to be exposed to unemployment. Segmentation theories 
                                               
2 The author also investigates West German temporary employment these results are, however, unconvincing. The 
author finds temporary contract workers in Germany to be less likely to become unemployed than permanent con-
tract workers, and, moreover, maintains this finding throughout a series of models (p. 380). She also finds that 
temporary workers are less likely, than permanent workers, to make a transition to labour market inactivity, again a 
finding which appears robust to the dataset generated for the analysis. Neither finding is explained to the degree 
required of a finding which is counter to all previous research on temporary workers labour market transitions, both 
within Germany (Giesecke and Groß 2003; McGinnity et al. 2004) and in other European countries (Polavieja 2001; 
Gash 2003; DiPrete et al. 2004) to name a few.  
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also led us to expect stark differences between the attributes of workers exposed to unemploy-
ment. 
 
1.3 National Context 
While temporary workers’ propensities for transitions to either permanent contract employment 
or to unemployment is expected to reflect employer’s utility for temporary employment the 
national context within which temporary workers find themselves is also a vital component to 
the labour market opportunities available to them. To test the assumption that national context 
will differentially determine the transitions of temporary contract workers, a comparative 
analysis of three different labour markets is conducted. The labour markets chosen for the 
analysis differ according to two axes considered vital to labour market dynamics. These axes are 
(1) the relative openness or flexibility of markets as well as (2) their levels of inclusion and/or 
integration. Broadly these axes reflect policies which support or impede demand-side (flexibility 
axis) and supply-side (inclusion/integration axis) market dynamics. The vital break with tra-
ditional economic portrayals of market dynamics is in the conceptualisation of policies of inclu-
sion, which in this case are those alleviating the structural constraints placed on workers that 
can impede supply.  
Markets were classified as flexible in accordance to their systems of employment protection 
legislation as well as the structure of their non-wage labour costs. Countries which allow em-
ployers to hire or fire workers with ease, and had low non-wage labour costs, were classified as 
flexible, those that did not were classified as rigid. Denmark and the UK are identified as flexible 
regimes while France was described as rigid3. The expectation here is that flexible regimes will 
allow greater job mobility and consequentially will support temporary workers transitions to 
permanent contract employment. We also expect more flexible regimes to distribute unemploy-
ment risk more equally across both forms of contract given the greater ease with which 
employers can fire permanent workers in flexible regimes.  
The degree to which markets were classified as integrative was determined with reference to 
systems of (a) trade unionism as well as systems of (b) education and training.  
                                               
3 Employment protection legislation in both Denmark and the UK are highly flexible allowing employers hire and 
fire workers with few impediments. France has comparatively greater bureaucratic impediments both in terms of 
hiring and firing workers as well as in the ability to hire a worker on a fixed-term contract (OECD 1999; Grubb and 
Wells 1993). Non-wage labour costs are also very low in Denmark, in the order of 0.6%, while non-wage labour 
costs reach 14% in the UK and 39% in France, these are average rates for the time period 1989-1994, sourced 
from Nickell (1997). 
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Consensual and centralised trade unionism is expected to police employment law and ensure 
that employers do not misuse temporary contract employment as a source of low cost labour. 
Coordination between the state and employers in education and training is expected to reduce 
the need for probation amongst temporary workers, increasing the speed of transition to 
permanent contracts. Such coordination between the state and employers is also expected to 
smooth the transition from school to work, with a considerable proportion of temporary workers 
young people in their first job4. Denmark is presented as an integrative market on the basis of its 
extensive and centralised trade unionism and its coordinated skill formation. The French market 
is regarded as semi-integrative with its low and segmented trade union density preventing it 
from gaining a fully integrative status. The UK is described as a non-integrative market with 
weak trade unionism and little co-ordination in its education and training system (Heath and 
Cheung 1998).  
In sum, the countries chosen for the analysis vary in their combination of flexibility and in their 
policies of market integration. These combined dimensions lead to the development of the 
typology and nationally specific hypotheses described below5. 
 
 
2 Hypotheses for Temporary Workers by Country 
The Danish labour market is presented as a flexibly integrative market on the basis of its 
flexible/open market and its coordinated trade union and education systems. It is predicted that 
the Danish regime will be the most conducive to temporary workers’ transitions to permanent 
contract employment. This is attributed to the flexibility of the Danish market, facilitating job-
to-job transitions, as well as its policies of integration, protecting workers from market failure: 
with its trade unionism enforcing equality legislation for temporary contract workers, and its 
coordinated education smoothing the transition from school to work and providing employees 
with qualifications required and understood by industry.  While we do not expect the Danish 
regime to remove the greater risk associated with unemployment for temporary contract 
workers, we do expect there to be considerably less evidence of an iniquitous distribution of this 
                                               
4 The proportion of temporary workers who were in their first job, that is those who claimed to have never worked 
before are the following for the dataset used: 10.4% of Danish temps, 33.2% of French temps and 33.2% of UK 
temps. 
5 A diagram of the institutional features of Danish, French and UK markets according to their relative tendencies for 
flexibility and/or integration is presented in the appendix (Figure A1).  
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risk amongst disadvantaged sub-groups within the market, such as women and the less 
educated.   
The UK labour market is presented as a flexibly non-integrative market on the basis of its 
flexible/open market, its uncoordinated education system and its weak trade unionism. We 
expect the flexibility of the UK market to facilitate temporary workers’ transitions to permanent 
contract employment. While we might expect the low rates of coordination to lead to market 
failure for temporary workers, decreasing their transitions to permanent contract work and 
increasing their transitions to unemployment, the lack of coordination in the British educational 
and training system is also likely to benefit the UK temporary worker market in the following 
manner. By failing to provide employers with adequate information concerning the skill content 
of qualifications UK employers’ are expected to disproportionately use temporary contracts as a 
form of probationary contract6. This leads us to expect considerable transitions from temporary 
contract work in the UK, to both permanent contract work, for temps who were successful in 
convincing their employers of their abilities on the job, and to unemployment, for those who 
were less successful.  
The French labour market is presented as a rigidly semi-integrative market on the basis of its 
rigid/closed market, its coordinated and centralised education and training system and its un-
equal concentration of trade unionism is certain industrial sectors, notably the public sector. We 
expect rigid employment law to hinder temporary workers’ transitions to permanent contracts 
and expect France to be the least supportive of temporary workers transitions to permanent 
contract work relative to either Denmark or the UK. While we might have expected the French 
education and training system to mediate the rigidity of the market7 ongoing failures to remedy 
the employment deficit have seen a more arduous transition from school to work (Goux and 
Maurin 1998). Moreover, recent attempts to shift unemployment have sought to generate 
temporary and reduced hour contracts through the exoneration of social security payments are 
also likely to contribute to an insider/outsider dynamic for temporary workers, relative to 
permanent workers, in France.  
These institutional factors are also likely to disproportionately expose temporary workers to 
unemployment risk, with temporary workers used as the principle means of obtaining numerical 
flexibility in a rigid market.  
                                               
6 This assumption is certainly supported in the descriptive statistics, where we find a higher proportion of highly 
educated temps in the UK relative to temps in France and Denmark, 39% of UK temporary workers have higher 
educational qualifications relative to 25% of Danish temps and 21% of French temps (Table A2 in the appendix).  
7 The French education system is described as highly centralised (Goux and Maurin 1998), with considerable inter-
action between the state and employers (Hancké 1996; Lefévre et al. 2002) facilitating agreed outcomes in the skill 
requirements of business. 
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3 The Data (1995-2001) 
This study is based on analyses of seven waves of the European Community Household Panel 
Survey (ECHP). The ECHP is a standardised comparative cross-national survey conducted in the 
Member States of the European Union under the auspices of the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (EUROSTAT). The samples were drawn by each member state as simple 
random samples, with information collected from respondents in face-to-face interviews in 
each panel year (1994-2001). The data set contains information both at the individual and 
household levels relating to human capital acquisition, occupation and industrial location as 
well as variables relating to individual well-being. The statistical technique applied, event 
history analysis (Allison 1984; Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995), allows us to examine the relative 
rates of transition of temporary workers to the standard employment contract and to 
unemployment.   
The dependent variable measures the duration of the individual in a temporary or part-time 
contract, established through analyses of job start and end dates collected at each year of the 
survey. The unit of measurement is continuous as exact job start and end dates were asked of 
respondents rather than being approximated as equal to the panel year in which a change in 
status was measured. Given that our population of interest is a minority group within the labour 
market, considerable effort was made to retain cases for the multivariate analysis. One means 
by which our sample size was maintained was through the generation of a sliding scale of job 
starts. This allowed us to set our starting time for each individual as the first year in which they 
record information concerning their job-start date. So if individual X did not offer a job start 
date in the first wave of the panel, as they were unemployed for instance, their job start date 
was taken from subsequent years of the sample. This alternative way of establishing the start 
date yielded additional cases that were vital, increasing our sample of 1286 temporary workers 
to 2797. The generation of a sliding scale of job starts is of particular importance for our sample 
because the variable measuring contract type, whether someone was employed on a permanent 
or temporary contract, was not asked until the second wave of the ECHP (1995). There is good 
reason to expect, given the short-term nature of the contract, that workers who were on 
temporary contracts in 1994 may have already left them by 1995. Those that remained in 
temporary contracts up until 1995 are likely, therefore, to have disproportionately long 
durations in temporary jobs, thereby biasing our sample. The second problem associated with 
our temporary worker sample is one of attrition. By 1995, the structure of the sample of the 
ECHP already changed in so far as some people who answered questionnaires in 1994 had 
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refused to remain sample members in 19958. While we could assume a random distribution of 
non-response, the inclusion of panel inflow was considered to be a more robust strategy9.  
The transitions of temporary workers to permanent contract employment was measured in two 
forms. The first measures the timing of a transition to a permanent contract for those temporary 
workers who had more than one job recorded in the panel. The second type of upward transition 
records changes in contract type from temporary to permanent within the one job, occurring 
when individuals gave different contract types over-time within the one job. The combined 
analysis of both within job and between job transitions was conducted to maximise on cell size. 
It should also be noted that this strategy is an enforced one for all analyses using calendar data 
(O'Reilly and Bothfeld 2002). 
Transitions to unemployment were measured in the following manner. The first means of 
identifying transitions to unemployment looked at the existence of a period of unemployment 
prior to the start of a second job, with the information provided allowing one to determine both 
the timing and the duration of the unemployment spell. The second means of identifying tran-
sitions to unemployment involved an assessment of variations in labour force status over-time, 
if we knew that the individual was in employment at time x, through their job start date, we 
would denote job end date as the interview date of the panel when their labour force status 
changed to unemployment10. 
The sample for the analyses excludes the self-employed, and is restricted to workers who are 
between 18 and 65 years of age. It should also be noted that for those whose jobs commenced 
on or before 1980, the job start date was bottom coded, meaning that the actual job start date 
is unknown. Given the problems associated with left-hand censoring in event history analysis 
(Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995) such cases have been excluded. 
 
 
                                               
8 The attrition for the ECHP sample after the first wave was 10 percent for France, 23 percent for the UK and 11.5 
percent for Denmark (Gallie and Jacobs 2000). The attrition rate for the UK is more difficult to interpret however, as 
the ECHP sample contains a sub-sample of the British Household Panel survey which was already in its 5th year 
before it was added to the ECHP sample.  
9 It should be noted that statistical tests of difference between the original 1995 sample and sample inflow were 
insignificant.   
10 It should be noted that the data construction is such that there is a slight bias in the possibility of recording a 
transition to permanent contract employment, rather than recording a transition to unemployment. Checks were 
made, involving different recodes of the data, and the proportions making transitions to different labour force 
statuses were found to vary somewhat. Nonetheless, the variations in observed transitions did not fluctuate 
sufficiently for one to have reservations about the validity of the data. 
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4 Non-parametric Distributions 
4.1 Transitions to the Standard Employment Contract 
Figure 1 shows the proportions of temporary workers who do not make a transition to a 
permanent employment contract by country. The first observation of note is that a majority of 
temporary workers make integrative transitions to permanent employment within the 
observation period. Danish and French temporary workers share a similar trajectory in the timing 
and the occurrence of their integrative transitions whilst UK temps appear to be the outliers 
with more rapid entry to permanent employment contracts. As Table 1.1 indicates, the between 
country difference in temporary workers’ survival functions is significant and our hypothesis of 
national divergence is supported.  
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Table 1.1: Cox Regression based Test for the Equality of Survival Curves, weighted data 
  Events Events Relative 
 Observed Expected Hazard 
    
DANISH Temporary Workers 160.19 139.77 1.170 
FRENCH Temporary Workers 310.99 382.13 0.829 
UK Temporary Workers 245.63 194.91 1.289 
    
Total 716.81 716.81 1.000 
    
 Wald chi2(2) 27.37 
  Pr>chi2  0.000 
 
4.2 Transitions to Unemployment 
Figure 2 shows the proportions of temporary workers who do not make a transition to unem-
ployment by country, for the same time period as that reviewed in Figure 1: 96 months. We find 
that UK temps appear to have the lowest transition rates of the three, but find the Danish 
transition rates to be sufficiently similar for there to be no statistically significant difference in 
this survival function. French temporary contract workers, however, are very clearly the most 
exposed to unemployment. Table 2.1 presents the tests of the between country differences in 
temporary workers’ survival functions to unemployment. 
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Table 2.1:  Cox Regression based Test for the Equality of Survival Curves11, weighted data 
  Events Events Relative 
 Observed Expected Hazard 
DANISH Temporary Workers 33.5 49.03 0.721 
FRENCH Temporary Workers 171.69 132.41 1.368 
UK  Temporary Workers 46.9 70.17 0.697 
    
Total 252.17 252.17 1.00 
    
 Wald chi2(2) 20.63 




Table 2.2 provides a similar analysis to those presented in figures 1 and 2 in tabular form, 
though specifies the survivor functions at distinct cut offs on the time axis. After a three-year 
period we find 58 percent of UK temps have made a transition to permanent employment, while 
this is true of 50 percent of Danish temps and 33 percent of French temps. After a period of five 
years the difference between Danish and UK temps is minimal and while we find French temps 
to be the clear losers in the proportions who have gone on to permanent contract employment, 
the proportion who have made the transition is sizeable nonetheless: 63 percent.  
 
Table 2.2 Survivor Functions of Temporary Workers transitions to the Standard Employment Contract and to 
Unemployment, by Country, weighted data, ECHP waves 2-8. 
  DENMARK  FRANCE  UNITED-KINGDOM 
 Transition to Permanent Contract Employment 
Time(months) S(f) S(f) S(f) 
    
0 1.000 1.000 1.000 
12 0.943 0.952 0.886 
36 0.498 0.766 0.418 
60 0.284 0.369 0.263 
 Transition to Unemployment 
Time(months) S(f) S(f) S(f) 
0 1.000 1.000 1.000 
12 0.944 0.851 0.933 
36 0.783 0.662 0.799 
60 0.723 0.606 0.774 
 
 
                                               
11While the test for the equality of the survival curves establishes that there is a significant difference between the 
three countries analysed, further tests, not shown here, establish no statistical significance between Danish 
temporary workers and UK temporary workers in their transitions to unemployment.  
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The proportions of workers who go on to make a transition to unemployment at similar cut-offs 
is much smaller. We find that after a 3 year period, 22 percent of Danish temps and 20 percent 
of UK temps have made a transition to unemployment, whereas the corresponding figure for 
France is 34 percent. The difference in the survivor function between transitions to unemploy-
ment relative to those to the standard employment contract is such that the difference between 
the 3 year and the 5 year cut-off is less stark than in the previous table. Here we find that five 
years after starting a temporary job, 28 percent of Danish temporary workers, 40 percent of 
French temporary workers and 23 percent of UK temps have made a transition to unemploy-
ment.  
This section presented a series of non-parametric analyses of temporary workers’ labour market 
transitions. Temporary workers were found to make considerable transitions to permanent 
contract employment, with UK temporary contract workers the most likely to make such 
transitions. Temporary workers were also found to make fewer transitions to unemployment 
than to permanent contract employment, with transitions to unemployment tailing off in a 
manner which transitions to permanent employment did not. French temporary workers were 
found to be the most likely to make transitions to unemployment12. This section suggests that 
temporary employment is more likely to be a bridge than a trap and that French temporary 
workers experience the most punitive labour market.  
 
 
5 Multivariate Analysis 
The following section presents piecewise constant exponential models of the transitions of 
temporary workers by country in an effort to identify the variables that account for the 
transitions of temporary workers. The variables are briefly reviewed here.  
 
Human Capital Variables: 
Education level was included as a categorical variable, with third level education excluded as 
the reference category. These categories correspond to ISCED codes: 5-7 (third level education) 
3-4 (upper secondary education) 0-2 (lower secondary education), the final category identifies 
those whose education is ongoing. A second human capital variable was introduced to the 
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model testing whether the respondent had any formal skills training13 and it was possible to 
introduce this as a time varying variable. The introduction of variables measuring human capital 
should allow us to establish whether more educated/skilled workers are more likely to make 




Age and its square are introduced to the model, with age squared introduced to capture any 
non-liniarities in workers transitions, such as older workers’ higher risks of unemployment at the 
outer ends of the distribution. Gender is also added to the model in an effort to determine 
whether women are more likely than men to make certain types of transition.  
 
Labour Market Variables: 
Occupational status is included in the models to control for variations in the transitions of 
different grades of worker and thereby test whether integrative transitions are more common 
amongst higher skilled temporary workers. The occupational classification used is based on the 
ISCO occupational categorisation. Industrial sector was introduced to the models but was even-
tually dropped as the coefficients were insignificant and when tested had no effect on the 
model over all.  
A dichotomous variable measuring whether the worker is in the public or private sector is 
introduced to the models, in an effort to determine whether there is a difference between 
employers in different sectors in their use of temporary employment.  
Working-time is also introduced to the models as a dichotomous variable with those whose 
working hours in their main job are less than 30 hours a week coded as 1. This should reveal 
whether temporary workers on part-time contracts are more constrained in their transitions 
than full-time temporary workers.  
Workplace size is presented in the models in a slightly doctored form as it was not asked of 
public sector employees in the first wave of the ECHP and was not subsequently asked of any 
public sector employees who did not start a new job in later waves. Missing information on this 
variable, which for the sample generated is in the order of 23 percent, was imputed separately 
for each country. An additional problem with this variable is that it is not directly comparable 
                                               




across all three countries. In the British sub-sample of the ECHP the size of the organisation, 
rather than the size of the local unit, is given14.  
A dichotomous variable measuring respondents’ exposure to unemployment prior to current job 
start was also included to assess the implications of a spell of unemployment for temporary 
workers future transitions.  
Finally, in the pooled analysis of the relative between country transitions variations in the 
macro-economic context were controlled for through the introduction of a variable measuring 
time-varying unemployment rates. The unemployment rates measure aggregate male/female 
unemployment rates for each year of the panel and were sourced from OECD data. Tables with 
the covariate means for our temporary worker sample are presented in the appendixes (Table 
A1). The models presented are piecewise constant exponential models with robust standard 
errors, and are weighted with the longitudinal weight provided by Eurostat in the ECHP.  
 
5.1 Temporary Workers Transitions to Permanent Contracts 
The model estimation for temporary contract workers transitions to permanent contract 
employment presents 4 models, one for each country and the fourth a pooled model of all three 
countries (Table 3). The models are the same for each individual country analysis and the pooled 
analysis. The models exclude permanent contract workers as the dynamics that govern 
temporary workers transitions to a permanent contract are expected to vary from those that 
govern the transitions of permanent contract workers to subsequent permanent contracts.  
                                               
14 The precise wording of the question asked was: How many regular paid employees are there in the business or 
organisation you work in? Please give an estimate. 0-500+, categorically coded on the questionnaire.  
Table 3: Piecewise Constant Exponential Model with Continuous Data: Temporary Contract Workers Transitions to PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT by Country, weighted data with 
Robust Standard Errors, waves 2-8 of the ECHP 
    Denmark     France     
United 





Std. Err. P>z Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P>z Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P>z Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P>z 
Danish Temporary Workers ( Reference UK Temporary Workers)       -0.11 0.13 0.387 
French Temporary Workers          -0.34 0.12 0.006 
Human Capital Variables             
Second Level Education ( Reference Third level 
Education) -0.21 0.26  -0.02 0.20  -0.26 0.20  -0.21 0.12 0.086 
Primary Level Education -0.03 0.29  -0.20 0.24  -0.07 0.19  -0.15 0.13  
Education Ongoing -0.29 0.63  -0.21 0.23  -1.55 1.26  -0.07 0.19  
Formal Training (TV) 0.31 0.31  -0.12 0.17  2.26 1.03 0.028 0.13 0.14  
Demographic Variables             
age -0.08 0.06  -0.10 0.06  0.11 0.04 0.004 0.02 0.03  
age2 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.00  
women 0.22 0.21  -0.15 0.15  -0.02 0.16  0.00 0.10  
Labour Market Variables             
Occupational Status             
Higher Professional (Ref Manual Worker) 0.676 0.373 0.070 0.891 0.420 0.034 -0.663 0.296 0.025 0.006 0.195  
Lower Professional 0.797 0.370 0.031 1.121 0.372 0.003 -0.150 0.287  0.407 0.181 0.024 
Clerical  0.273 0.352  0.914 0.351 0.009 0.128 0.214  0.351 0.156 0.024 
Skilled Manual 0.881 0.369 0.017 0.673 0.368 0.068 -0.345 0.307  0.277 0.176  
Sector             
Private Sector ( Ref Public Sector) 0.09 0.23  0.50 0.18 0.006 0.12 0.17  0.25 0.10 0.017 
Part-time -0.38 0.29  -0.32 0.19 0.096 -0.38 0.17 0.031 -0.39 0.12 0.001 
Workplace Size             
20-99 pple (Ref 1-19 pple) 0.58 0.21 0.006 0.09 0.17  0.15 0.20  0.26 0.11 0.017 
100-499 pple 0.54 0.26 0.042 0.05 0.20  0.19 0.24  0.24 0.13 0.073 
500+ pple 0.45 0.27 0.097 -0.10 0.28  -0.21 0.21  -0.05 0.15  
Unemployment Experience              
Spell of Unemployment Prior to current Job Start -0.061 0.177  -0.423 0.153 0.006 0.075 0.189  -0.15 0.10  
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Table 3 continued 
    Denmark     France     
United 





Std. Err. P>z Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P>z Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P>z Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P>z 
Baseline Hazards             
Duration 6-12 months -0.01 0.64  0.37 0.49  0.65 0.43  0.42 0.29  
Duration 12-24 1.52 0.50 0.003 1.44 0.43 0.001 1.79 0.38 0.000 1.59 0.25 0.000 
Duration 24-36 1.58 0.53 0.003 1.90 0.43 0.000 1.76 0.40 0.000 1.71 0.26 0.000 
Duration 36-48 months 1.44 0.62 0.020 1.49 0.46 0.001 1.28 0.46 0.005 1.36 0.28 0.000 
Duration 48-60 months 1.37 0.78 0.079 1.92 0.47 0.000 0.89 0.52 0.085 1.41 0.32 0.000 
Duration 60-72 months 0.96 0.74  0.88 0.62  1.78 0.49 0.000 1.20 0.34 0.000 
Duration 72-84 months 1.04 0.85  0.14 0.75  0.62 0.72  0.54 0.45  
Duration 84-96 months 1.68 0.54 0.002 1.41 0.48 0.003 1.46 0.47 0.002 1.57 0.27 0.000 
Constant -4.272 1.449 0.003 -3.495 1.165 0.003 -9.793 1.232 0.000 -5.97 0.58 0.000 
Model Summary                         
Log Likelihood (Constant Only)  -219.323   -363.230   -411.215   -997.47  
Log Likelihood ( with X var)  -179.948   -311.710   -354.643   -895.67  
Wald  80.930   95.320   86.740   147.96  
Pr of Model  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.00  
Observations/Failures  
1995 / 
149   
3314 / 
212   
3155 / 
239   8464/601  
                          
Model Findings: 
Human capital variables were added to the models to determine whether skills or education 
would facilitate temporary workers transitions to permanent contract employment. We also use 
these variables to establish whether temps are probationary contract workers, that is, highly 
skilled workers whose abilities are tested by employers during their short-term contract prior 
entry to permanent contract employment. We find the human capital variables to be weak 
predictors of temporary workers’ transitions with the sole exception of the UK were temporary 
workers with formal training show considerably higher transition rates to permanent contract 
employment15.  
The variables measuring the demographic characteristics of temporary workers are again not 
very predictive, though in the UK age increases the probability of making an integrative 
transition, though its square suggests that the trend is not linear.  
The strongest predictors of temporary workers’ future transitions to permanent employment 
relate to the type and grade of temporary employment within which temporary workers finds 
themselves. These variables also show the strongest between country variation. In Denmark and 
France temporary workers in manual occupations, the reference category, are less likely to make 
a transition to permanent contract employment than other occupational groups. This fits with 
our expectation of a dichotomy in the temporary labour market between temps used by 
employers as a means of gaining access to numerical flexibility in a low skill secondary market, 
and temporary contracts used by employers to screen highly skilled temporary workers. This 
suggests that temporary contract employment for skilled workers provides more direct routs into 
permanent contract employment, than is the case for manual contract workers. In the UK, 
however, we find temporary workers in the highest occupational positions to be less likely to 
make transitions to permanent employment than the reference group. Previous research on UK 
temporary workers’ transitions has also found some higher grades of worker to be less likely to 
make transitions to permanent contract employment (Booth et al., 2002: 203-204) though the 
authors do not discuss these. It is suggested here that this result may be driven by higher 
professionals on temporary contracts of considerable duration such as consultancy, or research 
contracts. The existence of higher professional temps on temporary contracts of longer duration 
would result in lower observed transition rates for this grade of temporary contract worker and 
                                               
15 One of the reasons behind the reduced impact of educational level on labour market transitions in the ECHP is 
the failure of the UDB version of the dataset to update the information on educational level between the first and 
the fifth panel of the survey. Given that the observation window for our temporary worker sample begins in the 
second wave of the ECHP we already expect the educational level variable to be less precise.  
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might explain the counter-intuitive finding established. We must also conclude that such 
contracts are not used to the same extent in either Denmark or France.  
In France we find temporary contract workers in the private sector to be considerably more 
likely to make a transition to a permanent contract than public sector temps. No similar effect is 
found for the other two countries. This is attributed to the considerable investment of the 
French state in active labour market programmes a large portion of which involve the 
generation of short-term contracts in the public sector, such as Contrat Emploi Solidarité and 
Contrat Emploi Solidarité. Both of these forms of contract have comparatively low training 
requirements relative to other active labour market programmes targeted at private sector 
employers (Gash 2003).  
Working-time was introduced to the models to establish whether temporary contract workers 
on reduced hour contracts were less likely to make integrative transitions, and we found this to 
be the case in the UK and to a certain extent France, though the coefficient is only significant 
at the .10 level. It is difficult to establish whether the lower rates of transition from part-time 
temporary employment is a function of choice or constraint. It may be that temporary part-time 
contract workers find it more difficult to find a second permanent part-time job. However, the 
cross-national variation also suggests institutional factors at work in that it is Denmark, the 
country with the greatest investment in public childcare, which is the only country where part-
timers are no different to full-timers in their transitions to permanent contract work16.  
Workplace size was a particularly strong predictor of Danish temporary workers transitions to 
permanent contract employment, with temporary workers in small workplaces less likely to 
make transitions to permanent contract employment. This is likely to be a function of a small 
firm’s greater dependency on temporary contracts, to offset their greater exposure to 
fluctuations in product demand. It is also likely that small workplaces have reduced 
opportunities for job mobility17.  
Finally, French temporary workers who had a spell of unemployment prior to their current job 
start were found to be less likely to make transitions to permanent contract employment. We 
found no similar dynamic in either Denmark or the UK.  
                                               
16 The public provision of childcare in Denmark represents an investment of 1.96 percent of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 1996, while France invested 1.5 percent of its GDP in the same year. The UK, on the other hand, 
has a comperatively low investment in public childcare representing 0.31 percent of its GDP (Rostgaard and 
Fridberg 1998).  
17 Denmark has a disproportionately large SME sector, 69%, relative to 63% in France and 56% in the UK - OECD 
(2003), OECD Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook, Paris. 
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Pooled Multi-Country Analysis 
The pooled multi-country model allows us to investigate which country is the most supportive 
of temporary contract workers transitions to permanent contract employment. We find French 
temporary workers to be significantly less likely to obtain permanent contract employment 
relative to either UK temporary workers, or Danish temporary workers. A variable measuring 
time variance in unemployment rates18 was also introduced to the model, and whilst significant, 
was found to have no effect on the model overall so is not included in the final multi-country 
model shown.  
This section reviewed the different factors which increase or decrease temporary workers’ 
chances of getting a permanent job. The variables which were found to be predictive in one 
country were not necessarily predictive in others, underling the caution required of country 
specific analyses when generalised to the cross-national context. The multivariate analysis 
confirmed our previous non-parametric finding: French temporary workers are the least likely to 
make transitions to permanent contract employment. 
 
5.2 Temporary Workers Transitions to Unemployment 
This section seeks to confirm our expectation that temporary workers are more likely than 
permanent workers to make a transition to unemployment, even after we control for a series of 
demographic, human capital and labour market variables. We also aim to uncover the country 
within which temporary workers are most exposed to unemployment risk.  
The model estimation was carried out in three stages. The first presents a simple test of the 
impact of contract on exit to unemployment. The second introduces a series of human capital, 
demographic and labour market variables in an attempt to test whether the increased 
unemployment risk associated with temporary employment can be explained by the 
demographic, human capital and/or labour market characteristics of atypical workers. The third 
presents a pooled multi-country analysis testing variation in unemployment risk by country. 
The first model estimated (EQ.1) presents a simple test of the temporary/permanent contract 
worker differential in unemployment risk (Table 4). We find that temporary workers are more 
likely to make transitions to unemployment than workers on a permanent contract in each 
                                               
18 The variable introduced here sought to control for the different unemployment rates in each country which 
might impact on workers transition rates. A high unemployment rate might discourage employers from converting a 
temporary job to a permanent job, or might influence a worker’s decision to search for another job that was 
permanent.  
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country analysed. Turning our attention to the coefficient from the model with controls, (EQ.2), 
we establish that even when we control for demographic, human capital and labour market 
characteristics temporary workers are still more likely than permanent workers to make a 
transition to unemployment. We also note that the strength of the coefficients vary by country, 
with unemployment a greater risk for French temporary workers and find Danish temporary 
workers, relative to permanent contract workers, to have the lowest risk.  
 
Control Variables 
While the model strategy in this section was to identify whether temporary workers increased 
unemployment risk is maintained once we control for a series of possible intervening factors, it 
is also interesting to analyse the impact of the covariates themselves.  
The variables measuring human capital are consistent with expectation with the less educated 
experiencing higher risks of unemployment. Age and its square are also found to be predictive 
with older workers generally less likely to be exposed to unemployment, though this is less true 
for workers at the outer ends of the distribution. Occupational level and sector were found to 
structure labour market transitions in each country. We found higher occupational grades to be 
less exposed to unemployment risk in Denmark and in the UK. In France, however, we found 
clerical workers to be more likely to enter unemployment than manual workers. An interaction 
term of temporary contract work with clerical work did not prove significant, so we can not 
attribute this finding to the high proportion of temporary contract workers in the clerical 
services.  
Workplace size is found to influence workers unemployment risk in all three countries, with 
workers in larger firms less likely than those in smaller firms to be exposed to unemployment. 
This is likely to reflect smaller firms disproportionate exposure to fluctuations in product 
demand and therefore their greater use of layoffs as a means of responding to decreased 
demand. Finally, workers who had been unemployed before the start of their current job were all 
considerably more likely to re-enter unemployment. 
Table 4: Piecewise Constant Exponential Model with Continuous Data: Temporary Contract Workers Transitions to UNEMPLOYMENT by Country, weighted data with Robust 
Standard Errors, waves 2-8 of the ECHP. 
    DENMARK     FRANCE     
UNITED 
KINGDOM   
  Coef. Robust Std. Err. P>z Coef. Robust Std. Err. P>z Coef. Robust Std. Err. P>z 
EQ 1 Temporary Contract (without controls) 0.723 0.265 0.006 1.221 0.173 0.000 1.157 0.235 0.000 
EQ 2 Temporary Contract (with controls) 0.502 0.257 0.051 1.114 0.189 0.000 0.952 0.234 0.000 
Human Capital Variables          
Second Level Education ( Reference Third level Education) -0.390 0.330  0.613 0.250 0.014 0.161 0.257  
Primary Level Education -0.097 0.309  0.753 0.267 0.005 0.272 0.209  
Education Ongoing -0.371 0.823  0.483 0.338  -1.283 1.058  
Formal Training (TV) -0.115 0.261  -0.123 0.151  -0.413 0.170 0.015 
Demographic Variables          
age -0.138 0.069 0.045 -0.085 0.049 0.082 -0.121 0.045 0.007 
age2 0.002 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.001 0.010 
women 0.354 0.274  -0.072 0.160  -0.163 0.193  
Labour Market Variables          
Occupational Status          
Higher Professional (reference Manual Worker) -1.021 0.551 0.064 0.312 0.348  -0.452 0.332  
Lower Professional -0.678 0.527  0.291 0.304  -1.286 0.447 0.004 
Clerical  -0.211 0.385  0.544 0.237 0.022 -0.360 0.273  
Skilled Manual 0.076 0.479  -0.087 0.292  -0.240 0.292  
Sector          
Private Sector ( Ref Public Sector) 0.303 0.263  0.572 0.174 0.001 0.424 0.272  
Part-time 0.279 0.315  0.756 0.157 0.000 -0.507 0.247 0.040 
Workplace Size          
20-99 pple (Ref 1-19 pple) -0.500 0.279 0.073 -0.210 0.160 0.189 -0.354 0.214 0.097 
100-499 pple -0.456 0.315  0.003 0.238  0.047 0.247  
500+ pple -0.958 0.438 0.029 -1.067 0.416 0.010 -0.660 0.249 0.008 
Unemployment Experience           
Spell of Unemployment Prior to current Job Start 0.770 0.221 0.001 0.478 0.154 0.002 1.014 0.185 0.000 
 
Table 4 continued  
    DENMARK     FRANCE     
UNITED 
KINGDOM   
  Coef. Robust Std. Err. P>z Coef. Robust Std. Err. P>z Coef. Robust Std. Err. P>z 
Baseline Hazards          
Duration 6-12 months 0.923 0.557 0.098 0.350 0.344  -0.299 0.340  
Duration 12-24 1.093 0.532 0.040 0.039 0.333  -0.426 0.313  
Duration 24-36 0.708 0.589  -0.425 0.353  -1.002 0.404 0.013 
Duration 36-48 months 0.295 0.672  -1.040 0.421 0.014 -0.390 0.361  
Duration 48-60 months 0.812 0.589  -0.903 0.426 0.034 -0.623 0.411  
Duration 60-72 months -0.466 0.789  -1.207 0.474 0.011 -0.973 0.478 0.042 
Duration 72-84 months -0.517 0.770  -0.651 0.441  -0.763 0.454 0.093 
Duration 84-96 months -0.331 0.543  -1.463 0.376 0.000 -1.032 0.372 0.006 
Constant -5.874 1.418 0.000 -5.975 0.993 0.000 -4.194 0.829 0.000 
Model Summary                   
Eq 1          
Log Likelihood (Constant Only)  -420.208   -874.220   -777.430  
Log Likelihood ( with X var)  -389.632   -740.260   -732.240  
Wald  65.660   304.660   103.140  
Pr of Model  0.000   0.000   0.000  
Eq 2          
Log Likelihood (Constant Only)  -420.208   -874.220   -777.430  
Log Likelihood ( with X var)  -351.330   -679.030   -673.150  
Wald  186.620   5506.430   207.660  
Pr of Model  0.000   0.000   0.000  
Observations/Failures   14031 / 103     25256 /215     31386 /174   
Pooled Multi-Country Analysis 
What table 4 does not reveal is whether temporary workers in one regime fare better than 
temporary workers in another, as the reference category in these analyses has been permanent 
contract workers within the same country. Table 5, which presents a piecewise constant 
exponential model pooled for all three countries, provides this information. As in the previous 
multi-country model the variables used as controls are the same as those found in the country 
specific models. Table 5 differs, however, in its provision of interaction terms of country by 
contract type. We find that Danish temporary contract workers are significantly less likely, at 
the point .10 level, to become unemployment relative to temporary contract workers in the UK. 
We also find no significant difference between French temporary contract workers and UK 
temporary contract workers in their unemployment risks. As with all significant interaction 
terms, the lower order variables, the variables from which the interaction terms were created, 
should not be interpreted for hypothesis testing (Braumoeller 2003). It should nonetheless be 
noted that the lower order variables for the model without interaction terms revealed there to 
be no statistical difference between countries in the transition to unemployment.  
 
 
Table 5: Piecewise Constant Exponential Model with Continuous Data: Pooled Multi-country Model of Tempo-
rary Contract Workers Transitions to UNEMPLOYMENT by Country, weighted data with Robust Standard Errors, 




Danish Temporary Worker (Reference UK temporary Worker) -0.559 0.299 0.062 
French Temporary Worker 0.305 0.241  
Temporary Worker 0.947 0.205 0.000 
Denmark (Reference United Kingdom) 0.279 0.177  
France  0.069 0.157  
Second Level Education ( Reference Third level Education) 0.158 0.149  
Primary Level Education 0.343 0.144 0.017 
Education Ongoing 0.121 0.279  
Formal Training (TV) -0.239 0.107 0.026 
Demographic Variables    
age -0.105 0.030 0.000 
age2 0.002 0.000 0.000 
women -0.041 0.110  
Labour Market Variables    
Occupational Status    
Lower Professional -0.108 0.199  
Clerical  0.303 0.180 0.092 
Skilled Manual 0.117 0.191  
Manual 0.286 0.229  
Sector    
Private Sector ( Ref Public Sector) 0.416 0.126 0.001 
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Table 5 continued 
Part-time 0.194 0.123  
Workplace Size    
20-99 pple (Ref 1-19 pple) -0.318 0.116 0.006 
100-499 pple -0.132 0.152  
500+ pple -0.771 0.185 0.000 
Unemployment Experience     
Spell of Unemployment Prior to current Job Start 0.804 0.110 0.000 
Baseline Hazards    
Duration 6-12 months 0.099 0.217  
Duration 12-24 -0.059 0.206  
Duration 24-36 -0.515 0.234 0.028 
Duration 36-48 months -0.633 0.256 0.013 
Duration 48-60 months -0.547 0.260 0.036 
Duration 60-72 months -1.075 0.305 0.000 
Duration 72-84 months -0.707 0.287 0.014 
Duration 84-96 months -1.187 0.235 0.000 
Constant -5.260 0.594 0.000 
Model Summary       
Log Likelihood (Constant Only)  -2074.475  
Log Likelihood ( with X var)  -1764.3486  
Wald  654.88  
Pr of Model  0.000  




This paper sought to determine whether temporary contract workers are more exposed to 
transitions to unemployment rather than transitions to the permanent contract. Two competing 
theoretical viewpoints were presented: The first, probationary contract theory, leads us to 
expect temporary workers to be more likely to obtain a permanent contract; the second, dual 
market and segmentation theories, leads us to expect reduced transitions to permanent contract 
employment and considerable transitions to unemployment. This paper also sought to establish 
whether different labour market institutions constrain temporary worker outcome differentially 
and thereby sought to establish whether the current debate offers an adequate account of 
temporary employment and labour market dynamics which is generalisable to divergent national 
contexts.  The three countries analysed; Denmark, France and the United-Kingdom, diverged on 
key features of market structuration.  
Denmark, which was presented as a flexibly integrative market on the basis of its flexible/open 
market and its coordinated trade union and education systems, was expected to be the most 
supportive of temporary workers’ transitions to permanent contract employment, and was 
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expected to mediate a portion of the greater risk associated with unemployment for temporary 
contract workers. 
The UK, which was presented as a flexibly non-integrative market on the basis of its 
flexible/open market, its uncoordinated education system and its weak trade unionism, was 
expected to support temporary contract workers’ transitions to permanent contract 
employment. This was attributed to the flexibility of its EPL and, counter-intuitively, to the lack 
of coordination in its educational and training system rendering UK employers dispro-
portionately dependent on probationary contracts to scan the skills of new recruits. We also 
expected UK temps to have high rates of transition to unemployment, with transitions to 
unemployment experienced by a portion of probationary contract temps, who were unsuccessful 
at convincing their employers of their abilities on the job, as well as temps who are used by UK 
employers as a source of low cost unprotected labour.  
France was presented as a rigidly semi-integrative market on the basis of its rigid EPL, its 
coordinated and centralised education and training system and its weak trade unionism. We 
expected French employment law to hinder temporary workers’ transitions to permanent 
contracts and while we might have expected the French education and training system to 
support temporary workers transitions to permanent contract work, recent attempts to shift 
unemployment through the generation of low cost temporary contract work were expected to 
contribute to a disadvantaged and segmented market for French temporary workers.  
Despite the popularity of marginalization theories concerning temporary contract work (Scherer 
2004; Giesecke and Gross 2003), we found considerable proportions of temporary contract 
workers making transitions to permanent contract employment. Moreover, our hypothesis of 
national divergence was supported, and in the direction anticipated, with the French system the 
least supportive of temporary workers transitions to permanent contract work. We also 
established that temporary contract workers make more transitions to permanent contract 
employment than to unemployment in each country, suggesting that temporary employment is 
more likely to be a bridge than a trap. 
The multivariate analyses revealed the following. Variables relating to temporary workers 
characteristics, their educational level, age, and gender, were considerably less predictive of 
integrative transitions than variables relating to the type and grade of temporary employment, 
these variables also showed the strongest between country variation. We found a dichotomy in 
the temporary labour market with temps in higher order professions making more transitions to 
permanent employment, than was the case for manual contract workers. In the UK, however, we 
 29
found temporary workers in the highest occupational positions to be less likely to make 
transitions to permanent employment than the reference group, this was attributed to higher 
professionals on temporary contracts of considerable duration such as consultancy, or research 
contracts.  
In France temporary contract workers in the private sector were more likely to make a transition 
to a permanent contract than public sector temps, a finding attributed to the considerable 
investment of the French state in active labour market programs a large portion of which 
involve the generation of short-term contracts in the public sector, such as Contrat Emploi 
Solidarité and Contrat Emploi Jeunes. Both of these forms of contract have comparatively low 
training requirements relative to other ALMPs targeted at private sector employers (Gash 2003). 
We also found French temporary workers who had a spell of unemployment prior to their 
current job start to be less likely to make transitions to permanent contract employment, and 
found no similar dynamic in either Denmark or the UK. This underlines the greater disadvantage 
associated with the temporary labour market in France and suggests cycles of non-integrative 
transitions for French temps.  
While temporary workers were found to make considerable transitions to permanent em-
ployment, they remained, in all three countries, disproportionately exposed to unemployment 
relative to permanent contract workers. This finding remained the case even when a series of 
controls were added to the country specific models. We also ran a multi-country model to 
establish whether there were between country differences in temporary workers’ exposure to 
unemployment. We found Danish temporary contract workers to be significantly less likely, at 
the point .10 level, to become unemployed relative to temporary contract workers in the UK. We 
also find no significant difference between French temporary contract workers and UK 
temporary contract workers in their unemployment risks. That French temps were found to be 
statistically similar to UK temps in their transitions to unemployment in a model with controls 
reveals the extent to which national variations in the composition of temporary contract 
employment determines observed outcomes.  
In sum, this paper establishes that temporary employment is more likely to be a bridge than a 
trap in three different European labour markets. We also establish that the French labour 
market, termed a rigidly semi-integrative market, was the least supportive of temporary workers 
transitions to permanent employment relative to other countries. This paper also underlines the 
role of nation specific market structuration on market outcome underlining the caution required 
when generalising from nation specific analyses to divergent national contexts. 
 30
7 References 
Allison, P. D. (1984). Event History Analysis: Regression for Longitudinal Event Data. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Blossfeld, H.-P., & Rohwer, G. (1995). Techniques of event history modeling: new approaches to causal 
analysis. Mahwah, N.J: Erlbaum. 
Booth, A., Francesconi, -. M., & Frank, -. J. (2002). Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends? 
Economic Journal of Literature, pp189-213. 
Braumoeller, B. F. (2003). Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms. International 
Organization. 
DiPrete, T., Goux, D., Maurin, E., & Quesnel-Vallee, A. (2004). Work and Pay in Flexible and Regulated 
Labour Markets: A Generalised Perspective on Institutional Evolution and Inequality Trends in 
Europe and the US. Paper for the ISA RC28 conference, Neuchâtel, Switzerland, May. 
Doeringer, P. B., & Piore, M. J. (1971). Internal labor markets and manpower analysis. Lexington, Mass: 
Heath. 
Doeringer, P. B., & Piore, M. J. (1985). Internal labor markets and manpower analysis. Armonk, N.Y ; 
London: Sharpe. 
Edwards, R. (1979). Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century. 
London: Heinemann. 
Gallie, D., & Jacobs, S. (2000). The European Community Household Panel: Appendix A. In D. Gallie & S. 
Paugam (Eds.), Welfare Regimes and the Experience of Unemployment in Europe. Oxford: OUP. 
Gash, V. (2003). Temporary and Part-time Work: Current Issues in French Research, Economic Change, 
Unequal Life-Chances and Quality of Life. Oxford. 
Giesecke, J., & Groß, M. (2003). Temporary Employment: Chance or Risk? European Sociological Review., 
19, pp161-177. 
Giesecke, J., & Groß, M. (2004). External Labour Market Flexibility and Social Inequality. European 
Societies, 6, pp 347-382. 
Gordon, D. M., Edwards, R., & Reich, M. (1982). Segmented Work, Divided Workers: The Historical 
Transformation of Labor in the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goux, D., & Maurin, E. (1998). From Education to First Job: The French Case. In Y. Shavit & W. Müller 
(Eds.), From School to Work: A Comparative Study of Educational Qualifications and 
Occupational Destinations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Grubb, D., & Wells, W. (1993). Employment Regulation and Patterns of Work in EC Countries. OECD 
Economic Studies, 21. 
 31
Hall, P., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage. Oxford: OUP. 
Hancké, B., & Soskice, D. (1996). Coordinating and Restructuring in Large French Firms: The Evolution of 
French Industry in the 1980's. WZB, Discussion Paper, FS-96-303. 
Heath, A., & Chung, S. Y. (1998). Education and Occupation in Britain. In Y. Shavit & W. Müller (Eds.), 
From School to Work: A Comparative Study of Educational Qualifications and Occupational 
Destinations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Henguelle, V. (1994). Les Emplois sur Contrat à Dureé Déterminée: un Mode d'Acces à l'Emploi Stable? 
Travail et Emploi, 58. 
Lefèvre, G., Michon, F., & Viprey, M. (2002). Les Stratégies des Entreprises de Travail Temporaire, Acteurs 
Incontournables du Marché du Travail, Partenaires Experts en Ressources Humaines. Travail et 
Emploi, 89. 
McGinnity, F., Mertens, A., & Gundert, S. (2004). A Bad Start? Fixed-term Contracts and the Transition 
from Education to Work in West Germany. Working Paper of the Project Employment 
Relationships at Risk. MPI-Berlin, 2. 
Nickell, S. (1997). Unemployment and Labour Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe. 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, pp 55-74. 
OECD (1999). Employment Outlook. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OECD (2003). Small and Medium Enterprise Outlook. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
O'Reilly, J., & Bothfeld, S. (2002). What Happens After Working Part-time? Integration, Maintenance or 
Exclusionary Transitions in Britain and Western Germany. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26, 
pp 409-439. 
Piore, M. J., & Sabel, C. F. (1984). The second industrial divide : possibilities for prosperity. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Polavieja, J. G. (2001). Insiders and Outsiders: Structure and Consciousness Effects of Labour Market 
Deregulation in Spain (1984-1997). Madrid. 
Rostgaard, T., & Fridberg, T. (1998). Caring for Children and Older People- A Comparison of European 
Policies and Practices. Copenhagen: The Danish Institute of Social Research 98:20. 
Scherer, S. (2004). Stepping-stones or Traps? The consequences of labour market entry positions on 
future career in West Germany, Great Britain and Italy. Work, Employment and Society, 18, pp 
369-394. 
Soskice, D. W. (1999). Divergent production regimes: coordinated and uncoordinated market economies 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 32
Weiss, A. (1995). Human Capital versus Signaling Explanations of Wages. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 9, pp133-154. 
Zijl, M., van den Berg, G., & Heyma, A. (2004). Stepping-Stones for the Unemployed: The Effect of 
















Table A2: Covariate Proportions and Means for the Temporary Worker Sample by Country  
  Denmark France United-Kingdom 
Age (mean)  32.35 28.52 31.69 
     
Women  52.04 48.63 54.48 
     
Educational Level Third level  24.95 20.97 38.97 
 Upper Secondary  47.57 28.23 23.61 
 Lower Secondary  27.47 50.81 37.42 
     
Job related Training   48.28 49.25 56.70 
     
Part-time  19.14 29.05 30.93 
     
Occupation higher professional 17.58 8.98 21.33 
 lower professional 11.61 13.64 9.89 
 clerical and service 37.04 38.52 43.28 
 skilled manual 14.84 25.36 12.86 
 manual 18.93 13.50 12.64 
     
Firm Size Firm size 1-19  41.24 29.11 32.57 
 Firm size 20-99 31.61 44.63 30.13 
 Firm size 100-499 14.61 15.87 10.17 
 Firm size 500+ 12.54 10.39 27.13 
     
Industrial Sector Public Sector 47.01 37.04 31.37 
     
Unemployment  
Spell Prior to Job 
Start  43.65 54.75 18.63 
 
Market Integration Policies 
(Trade Unionism + Skilling Regime) 
Low    High 
Market Flexibility 
(EPL and Non-wage 
labour costs) 
UK DK 
FR 
